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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to answer the following question: can the considerable rise in the 
volatility of the LAC stock markets in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis be explained by 
the worsening financial environment in the US markets? To this end, we rely on a time-
varying transition probability Markov-switching model, in which “crisis” and “non-crisis” 
periods are identified endogenously. Using daily data from January 2004 to April 2009, our 
findings do not validate the “financial decoupling” hypothesis since we show that the 
financial stress in the US markets is transmitted to the LAC’s stock market volatility, 
especially in Mexico.   
JEL Classification: C13, C22, G01, G15.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines empirically the relationship between the rise in volatility of the Latin 
American countries (LAC) and the worsening in the financial environment in the US market 
in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis. We study the respective roles of local factors 
(regional volatility) and US financial stress factors in the dynamics of the stock market 
volatility of five LAC (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). We show that the 
financial stress in the US markets is transmitted to these countries’ stock market volatility, but 
not in the same scale. Our findings support the idea of heterogeneity among the LAC markets, 
in the sense that the 2007/2008 subprime crisis did not equally affect all the countries, despite 
the fact that high volatility of the equity prices was observed everywhere. This is in 
accordance with the two views that have been at the centre of the policy debate in Latin 
America regarding the vulnerability of the financial markets to the subprime crisis.  
On the one hand, one may claim that the LAC’s banking and financial sectors showed 
resilience to the crisis and put forward the thesis of a financial decoupling with respect to the 
rest of the world (see Powell and Martinez (2008) and Pereira Valadao and Gico Jr. (2009) 
among others). Although the countries initiated vast liberalization reforms of their financial 
markets, they still had a low market capitalization, a weak financial depth and the banking 
intermediation represented almost 90% of the non-financial corporate financing before the 
crisis. The spectacular development of market capitalization was the fact of only a few big 
companies. Furthermore, many domestic banks remained solvent and profitable, had healthy 
capital adequacy ratios and median return on equity. Above all, the domestic banks held few 
of the “toxic assets” that triggered the subprime crisis. According to this view, the crisis in the 
LACs was essentially the consequence of a factor that is not related to a “financial channel”, 
namely the precipitous decline in prices of raw materials which reversed the growth rates of 
the last five years.2 So, a downward movement in the terms of trade was the dominant factor 
of the economic collapse (IMF (2008), Powell and Martinez (2008) and Pereira Valadao and 
Gico Jr. (2009)).  
On the other hand, one can think about the influence of financial factors, given the degree of 
integration between the LAC’s financial markets and the United States’. Empirical papers 
studying the co-movements across stock markets report increasing correlations during the past 
five years, especially since 2007 (see Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Hesse (2009)). Studies by the 
IMF (2008) also point to spillover effects from the US financial markets to the LAC’s through 
different channels (equity market channel, market risk premium, global credit, etc.). Besides, 
there are cross-border effects implying that LAC financial markets are integrated with 
advanced economies. Indeed, many LAC have endured the sharp decrease in the US liquidity 
market (a typical example is Mexico), have suffered from funds withdrawals (as foreign 
banks transferred resources to their central offices), and the equity markets accumulate losses 
that threat the life of some companies (examples are Chile and Colombia). 
We do not examine in this paper the question as whether the financial stress in the US during 
the subprime crisis propagated to the LAC through real or financial channels. Recent studies 
show that these channels were in fact intertwined (for an illustration, see Paiva (2009)). We 
rather concentrate on the financial linkage and examine empirically the link between the US 
                                                 
2
 In this paper we focus our attention on the “financial channel” and on testing the financial decoupling hypothesis. 
While interesting, the question as whether the LAC equity markets were affected by the subprime crisis through raw 
materials or real channels is beyond the scope of the paper. 
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subprime crisis and the volatility of the LAC stock markets. There are several motivations to 
focus our attention on volatility. First, volatility of equity prices is usually viewed as an 
indicator of financial stress for the different segments of financial markets. Secondly, over the 
last ten years, the volatility of LAC financial markets has become a key determinant for 
explaining the risk-taking behaviors of investors, especially the substitution in their portfolios 
between different categories of securities (corporate and government bonds). Thirdly, as 
volatility tends to decline (resp. increase), it releases (resp. augments) risk budgets of 
financial firms and encourages (resp. discourages) position-taking. In particular, during the 
subprime crisis, the observed changes in volatility determined adjustments in domestic 
balance sheets and leverage conditions. 
We thus aim at answering the following question: can the considerable rise in the volatility of 
the LAC equity markets in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis be explained by the 
worsening financial environment in the US markets? As previously mentioned, the answer to 
this question is not straightforward. Indeed, due to the disastrous consequences of the 
financial crises they faced during the decades of 1990 and 2000, LAC’s policymakers adopted 
measures aiming at insulating their markets from external shocks. Firstly, they adopted 
macroeconomic policies to avoid future crises due to flawed fundamentals.3 Secondly, there 
was a passionate debate among the policymakers regarding the opportunity of adopting 
measures such as capital controls as a management tool in times of crises. Mexico and 
Argentina opted for a total liberalization, while Brazil, Chile and Colombia chose to adopt 
capital controls during the years preceding the 2007 crisis. The question of financial 
decoupling is still a debated issue in Latin America.  
Several econometric models have been used in the literature to study the coupling and 
decoupling between the LAC stock markets and financial stress in international capital 
markets. Recent studies have looked at this issue during the subprime crisis (Frank et al. 
(2008), Berglof et al. (2009), Gonzalez-Hermilloso and Hesse (2009), Rose and Spiegel 
(2009)). In terms of model specification, many of them rely on VAR models, multivariate 
GARCH models, or time-varying common factor models. In this paper, we re-examine this 
issue using a more powerful econometric tool, namely a time-varying transition probability 
Markov-switching model (TVPMS) proposed by Kim et al. (2008). Compared to the previous 
ones, this model has the advantage of being helpful in investigating whether the impact of the 
financial stress indicators is nonlinear, with an influence differing between crisis and non-
crisis episodes. Crisis and non-crisis regimes are identified endogenously, and the switch from 
one regime to the other can happen at any time. In other words, contrasting with structural 
break models, the time of the changes is not forced a priori, and we do not separate, ex ante, 
the sample into two parts with respect to a given time. Our study therefore contributes to the 
empirical literature on financial contagion, as it investigates the transmission mechanisms of 
crises.4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, some stylized facts 
on the volatility of the LAC equity markets and their links with the US market. They suggest 
both the presence of an asymmetric dynamics and co-movements with the financial stress 
indicators in the US markets. In Section 3, methodological concerns relating to TVPMS 
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 The IMF economic outlooks for LAC in 2007 and 2008 show that these countries had good economic fundamentals 
during the subprime turmoil. 
4
 For other recent contributions, see Dungey et al. (2010), Aloui et al. (2011), Barba and Ceretta (2011), Breuss (2011).  
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models are outlined. In Section 4, we estimate and comment the different TVPMS models. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes.   
2. Data and stylized facts on the volatility of LAC stock markets in the aftermath of 
the subprime crisis 
2.1. Data 
We investigate the links between the financial markets of the US and five Latin American 
countries for which we have a complete database: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 
To this end, we use daily data for the following series: equity market indices for the five 
considered Latin American countries. To ensure that our results are not specific to a particular 
stock price series, two equity indices are considered for each country. On the one hand, we 
rely on the S&P/IFCI price indices, that are subsets of S&P/IFCG indices,5 and measure the 
returns of stocks that are legally and practically available to foreign investors. On the other 
hand, we use the following stock market indices: (i) BOVESPA price index for Brazil, (ii) 
Chile INTER10 price index for Chile, (iii) IGBC price index for Colombia, (iv) BOLSA price 
index for Mexico, and (v) LIMA SE price index for Peru.  
To choose the financial variables that could have affected the LAC equity price volatility, we 
refer to the literature6 suggesting that several adverse spillover effects may explain the 
transmission of the global crisis to the LAC’s financial sectors: (i) the slowdown in total 
lending by foreign parent banks to their local affiliates due to liquidity constraints in interbank 
markets (credit crunch transmission channel), (ii) sudden stop effects implied by liquidity 
risks in the international markets and inducing withdrawals of liabilities owed to nonresidents, 
(iii) the lack of access to foreign borrowing, (iv) the losses associated with foreign exchange 
derivative positions, and (v) banks’ exposure to stock market fluctuations. As the global crisis 
originated in the financial markets of the industrialized countries, these channels are expected 
to be closely tied with financial stress indicators, particularly those reflecting market and 
liquidity risks: ABCP (asset-backed commercial papers) and CDS (credit default swap) 
spreads, bank funding liquidity, stock market liquidity. We use the US S&P 500 stock market 
index whose squared returns act as a proxy of the US market volatility.7 The endogenous 
variables are the respective volatility of LAC’s stock markets, defined as the squared returns 
of the first-difference of the logged stock indices. Data are extracted from Datastream and 
span the period from January 2004 to April 2009. 
2.2. How strong was the link with the US stock markets? 
The heterogeneous response of the LAC to the subprime crisis resulted from different degrees 
of interdependency with the US financial markets. The two extreme cases are, on the one 
hand, Mexico which has the closest ties given its membership to NAFTA and cross-border 
capital flows, and, on the other hand, Brazil whose regulatory framework imposes constraints 
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 S&P/IFCI indices typically cover a high percentage of the stocks in the S&P/IFCG indices. 
6
 See IMF (2008) and Berkmen et al. (2009). 
7
 The complete description of data is given in Appendix 1. For Colombia, many data on the S&P/IFCI equity index 
were lacking, so for this country we only consider the IGBC stock index series. The series are transformed into first-
difference since the unit root tests show that they are I(1) (results available upon request to the authors). 
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on risk-taking behaviors. Regarding the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking 
sector, their share varies from only 15% in Peru to 80% in Mexico, thereby implying that the 
banking disturbances in the US have had less impact in some countries relative to others. In 
Brazil, for instance, the market share of foreign banks in local banking system is only 30%, 
20% in Colombia, while it is 50% in Chile and Mexico. Contagion effects from the subprime 
crisis were also different across countries due to differences in financial regulation. For 
instance, the Brazilian government has imposed strict transparency requirements on the report 
of net asset values of hedge and equity funds so that investors did not choose to long lock up 
for their investments and rarely take illiquid positions. Conversely, up until the 2008 crisis, 
private equity funds were less regulated in Mexico, and contagion effects are more important 
because investors are under pressure not to outperform their competitors in the US and in the 
sub-region. Besides, compared with Mexico, countries like Brazil, Chile and Peru did not 
experience a major financial crisis for the following reason. As shown by the ECLAC (2009), 
countries that were the most affected by the financial turmoil in the US market were also 
those which were the more severely hit by the adverse shocks on export earnings. Due to their 
tightest link with the Asian emerging countries, Brazil, Chile and Peru have continued to 
export towards the Asian markets that showed a decoupling from the rest of the world. As a 
consequence, there was less uncertainty in these countries’ stock markets relative to Colombia 
or Mexico, because the impact on growth of the adverse shocks due to the drop of export 
earnings was weaker. In Mexico, growth deceleration was characterized by a drop in GDP 
from 3.3% in 2007 to 1.3% in 2008 and -7% in 2009. By contrast, in Brazil, the GDP 
decreases from 5.5% to 5.1% between 2007 and 2008 and to -0.8% in 2009. In Chile, the 
growth rate was respectively 5.1%, 3.2% and -1.0% in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and in Peru 
9.0%, 9.8% and 2%.  
2.3. How did the volatility evolve during the crisis? 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 summarizes preliminary evidence regarding the squared returns of the stock indices,8 
by highlighting a huge increase in volatility during the year 2008. The figures also show 
higher volatility before the onset of the subprime crisis period (“local” peaks). Moreover, the 
highly leptokurtic distributions of the squared returns suggest a non-constant and time-
dependent volatility. To account for these characteristics, we estimate alternative GARCH-
type models to see whether they capture a phenomenon of volatility clustering. Figure 2 
shows the graphs of the volatility derived from a simple GARCH model.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The GARCH specification puts forward the existence of changing regimes in the volatility of 
stock markets. Indeed, in September 2008, the stock returns volatility increases strongly in the 
five countries. The collapse of Lehman Brothers entailed a wave of stress on LAC stock 
markets. However, the countries show some peculiarities, which are revealed by the different 
graphs. 
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 Similar patterns are obtained with the S&P/IFCI indices, but have not been reported here to save space.  
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Consider first the case of Brazil. During the crisis, the volatility increases at exceptional levels 
and reaches a maximum around 459 at the beginning of October 2008. However, this peak of 
volatility is not long-lasting, because the volatility falls once after (achieving levels close to 
5). The crisis thus induced a sudden increase in volatility, but of low duration, in the Brazilian 
stock market. Turning to Chile, the movements of volatility are a little bit different. We 
indeed notice a surge in October 2008, but also a strong increase at the beginning of the year. 
The market underwent a situation of stress before the collapse of the world stock markets. We 
also observe that the amplitude of the volatility is not the same as in Brazil, because, in non-
crisis periods, the volatility varies between 0.5 and 2 depending upon whether the market is in 
a phase of low or high volatility. From the year 2008, the volatility increases, until reaching a 
peak around 15 in October, and then decreases smoothly at levels comparable to those 
preceding the year 2008. 
Regarding Colombia, the pattern exhibits differences in comparison with the other countries. 
This country experienced a very sudden acceleration of its volatility during the months of 
May and June 2006, achieving a level of 70. This period was characterized by a strong fall of 
the stock market returns. Indeed, a 10% fall in the index forced the stock market authorities in 
Bogota to suspend their operations for the first time of their history. After this period, the 
volatility stabilizes near 2. A second period of stress appears at the beginning of 2008, but of 
much weaker intensity, since the volatility reaches “only” a level of 23. Finally, like the other 
countries, Colombia underwent the effects of the fall of the world stock markets in October 
2008, and its volatility increased quickly. Like Colombia, Mexico experienced a situation of 
financial stress on its stock market during the month of June 2006, but in a much lesser 
proportion (its volatility was only near 8). However, the volatility increased at the end of the 
years 2007 and 2008. 
Finally, Peru underwent episodes of exceptional volatility during the financial crisis, 
particularly after the fall of Lehman Brothers: the volatility reaches a level equal to 125 in 
October 2008, increasing the risk of variations of the short-term returns. A strong period of 
volatility also appears at the end of the year 2007 till the middle of 2008, caused by the 
important phase of stress during which the stock market decreased by 70 %. 
2.4. Evidencing the regime-dependent characteristic of volatility 
We estimate alternative GARCH-family models to investigate whether the squared returns 
show time-varying dynamics in the volatility of stock returns. In particular, we are interested 
in detecting asymmetric dynamics, regime-dependent behaviors, smooth and rapid transition 
from low (resp. high) to high (resp. low) volatility, and highly persistent volatility regimes 
during a period that includes the months of the subprime crisis. Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix 2 display the values of the information criteria corresponding to the different 
estimated models.10 They show an overwhelming evidence that the models that account for 
regime-dependent volatility uncover the data better than the others. For the S&P/IFCI series, 
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 These figures regarding the level of volatility are given only for comparison purposes across countries (they have no 
unit). 
10
 The estimated GARCH models are the following: GARCH, Exponential GARCH (EGARCH), Power GARCH 
(PGARCH), Logistic and Exponential Smooth Transition GARCH (LSTGARCH and ESTGARCH), Asymmetric 
Nonlinear Smooth Transition GARCH (ANST-GARCH) and Quadratic GARCH (QGARCH). To avoid too many 
tables, and because this paper focuses on alternative regime-dependent models, the estimates are not reported but are 
available upon request to the authors.  
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both the LSTGARCH and ESTGARCH nonlinear models indeed yield the lowest values of 
the information criteria and the highest maximum likelihood. For the other stock returns 
series, the LSTGARCH model is also the best specification for Colombia, Mexico and Peru, 
while the Q-GARCH and EGARCH models fit better the nonlinear asymmetric behavior of 
the squared returns of Brazil and Chile. 
The nonlinear GARCH models provide evidence that we should rely on regime-dependent 
volatility models to account for the properties of the squared returns. However, regarding our 
main objective—testing the hypothesis of a link between the degradation of US financial 
markets and the volatility of the LAC stock markets—using autoregressive models is not 
enough. Indicators of financial stress in the US markets can be considered as “common 
factors” to the LAC countries, explaining why we observe “explosion” of volatility at the 
same dates in the five equity markets (2006 for Colombia and Mexico, 2007 and 2008 for all 
the countries). These common factors are, for instance, the ABCP and CDS spreads, the US 
market liquidity, or the interbank market rates. Figures 3 through 6 show that these variables 
exhibit a high variability during the periods of increasing volatility in the equity markets in 
the five Latin American countries.  
INSERT FIGURES 3 THROUGH 6 ABOUT HERE 
Common markets factors are not easily handled in standard GARCH-family models11  
because they imply strong restrictions for the conditions of stationarity and non-negativity of 
the variance (see for instance Hwang and Satchell (2005)). Alternative models have thus been 
suggested in the literature, such as factor models which have been found very successful.12 
These models are however not suited for our goal. Indeed, we do not seek to discriminate 
between countries’ volatility changes induced respectively by idiosyncratic and common 
components. We focus on components related to worldwide variables and want to see how 
they affect the volatility regime. We accordingly consider an alternative framework—time-
varying probability Markov-switching model—to investigate whether the regime-dependent 
property of the volatility can be explained by the financial stress indicators in the US market. 
To ensure that the volatility of all stock returns is well described by nonlinear, Markov-
switching processes and not by structural changes, we test the hypothesis of linearity against 
the alternative of a Markov-switching model following the methodology proposed by 
Carrasco et al. (2009). Their testing approach covers the class of Markov-switching models 
where the parameters vary according to an unobservable Markov chain and for which the 
standard approaches do not apply (due to the presence of nuisance parameters). The test 
requires the estimation of the model under the null hypothesis of parameter stability and relies 
upon bootstrap simulations in order to compute the critical values. Results are reported in 
Table A3 in Appendix 2 and show that, for all the countries and all the endogenous variables, 
the null hypothesis of no regime change is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative of two-
state Markov-switching models.  
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 Such models are called GARCHX models. 
12
 See, among many others, Engle et al. (1990), Campbell et al. (2001), Connor et al. (2006), Clements and Collet 
(2008). 
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3. TVPMS models of the volatility of the LAC stock returns 
3.1. Motivation and main characteristics 
We estimate time-varying probability Markov-switching (TVPMS) models in order to 
account for changes in volatility regimes. We adopt the framework proposed by Kim et al. 
(2008) which has the advantage of considering the correlation between the two noises that 
respectively define the process under examination and the transition probabilities. We 
consider “ordinary” regimes characterized by low variations of the price indices, and identify 
“crisis” or “turbulent” regimes when they manifest with large price deviations (high 
volatility). The TVPMS models are more suited for our analysis than other early warning 
systems or signal extraction models (logit/probit models, event analysis, signal approach) for 
the following reasons.  
First, the signal approach requires an ex ante definition of a threshold level above which one 
considers that a crisis is triggered. Similarly, the logit/probit analysis requires the definition of 
a crisis dummy, with possible misspecifications. One advantage of the TVPMS model is that 
we let the model determine endogenously which days correspond to low and high volatility.  
Secondly, the TVPMS model can be considered as the autoregressive representation of a 
probabilistic nonlinear GARCH model, and is thus more general than a usual deterministic 
nonlinear GARCH model. This model mimics the volatility as resulting from a learning 
phenomenon with investors making a Bayesian inference on the process that governs 
volatility changes. The volatility dynamics is time-varying, with the volatility today being 
influenced by its past level according to the value taken by a third variable. The latter is 
unobserved, and the way in which regime shifts from low to high volatility occur is not 
known with certainty. For instance, regarding the numerous factors that usually affect the 
equity price volatility in the LAC (economic policies, speculation, contagion channels 
stemming from trade or financial linkages), we cannot say a priori that the turmoil in the 
American financial markets was the root cause of the observed increased volatility of the 
LAC equity markets during 2008. The only thing we can say is that this may have been the 
case with a given likelihood. The TVPMS model precisely tries to evaluate this likelihood.  
Thirdly, since we are looking for changes in volatility regimes that are associated with the 
crisis, the kind of underlying regime change is assumed to happen only occasionally and to 
take the form of discrete events. Such changes are not adequately captured by standard 
nonlinear GARCH models since the latter assume that changes occur continuously over the 
sample. 
3.2. The empirical model 
We define the endogenous variable ݕ௧ (t = 1, …, T) as the first-difference of the squared stock 
returns. The TVPMS model is defined as follows:  
y୲ ൌ ቊ
αଵ ൅ βଵy୲ିଵ ൅ σଵε୲,   with a probability pଵ୨ሺz୲ሻ 
ߙଶ ൅ βଶy୲ିଵ ൅ σଶε୲,   with a probability pଶ୨ሺz୲ሻ
,     (1) 
where ε୲ ׾ i. i. Nሺ0,1ሻ. ߙଵ, ߙଶ, ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߪଵ, ߪଶ are scalars. ݕ௧ is assumed to  “visit” two regimes: 
a high volatility regime corresponding to crisis periods, and a low volatility regime capturing 
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non-crisis or “normal” periods. The occurrence of a regime is referred by an unobserved state 
variable ݏ௧ that takes two values:  1 if the observed regime is 1 and 2 if it is regime 2.
13  
ݏ௧ is conditioned by ݏ௧ିଵ, ݏ௧ିଶ, ڮ , ݏ௧ି௞. At any time  τ ൏ ݐ , the regime that will be observed 
at time t is not known with certainty. We thus introduce a probability P of occurrence of ݏ௧ 
given the past regime. We assume, for purpose of simplicity, that s୲ is a first-order Markov 
chain with transition probabilities: 
 ܲሼݏ௧ ൌ ݅ ݏ௧ିଵ⁄ ൌ ݆, ݖ௧ሽ ൌ ݌௜௝ሺݖ௧ሻ,       (2) 
where z୲ is a vector of predetermined “transition” variables that govern the transition from 
one regime to the other (stress indicators in the US market).  
Assuming a Probit specification14 for the occurrence of z୲ on ݏ௧, we have: 
 s୲ ൌ ൜
1, if η୲ ൏ aଵሺs୲ିଵሻ ൅ bଵሺs୲ିଵሻݖ௧
2, if η୲ ൒ aଶሺs୲ିଵሻ ൅ bଶሺs୲ିଵሻݖ௧
,      (3) 
where η୲ ׽ i. i. Nሺ0,1ሻ. We also suppose that ൤
ε୲
η୲
൨ ׽ Nሺ0,Σሻ,    Σ ൌ ൤
1 ρ
ρ 1൨ and 
 cov൫ε୲, η୲േ୦൯ ൌ 0, ׊h ് 0.  
We accordingly define the transition probabilities as follows: 
ቊ
ܲሼݏ௧ ൌ 1 ݏ௧ିଵ ൌ ݆⁄ , ݖ௧ሽ ൌ ݌ଵ௝ሺݖ௧ሻ ൌ Φሺaଵሺs୲ିଵሻ ൅ bଵሺs୲ିଵሻݖ௧ሻ
ܲሼݏ௧ ൌ 2 ݏ௧ିଵ ൌ ݆⁄ , ݖ௧ሽ ൌ ݌ଶ௝ሺݖ௧ሻ ൌ 1 െ Φሺaଶሺs୲ିଵሻ ൅ bଶሺs୲ିଵሻݖ௧ሻ
,   (4) 
where Φ is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function.  
The usual probabilistic properties for the ergodicity and the invertibility of the TVPMS model 
applies if we assume that y୲ and z୲ are covariance-stationary.
15  
The above model can be generalized to a higher number of states (see Kim et al. (2008)) and 
encompasses several classes of Markov-switching models previously proposed in the 
literature. It is very similar to the time-varying probability models introduced by Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1973), Diebold et al. (1994), Filardo (1994), but it is more general by assuming that 
the two processes εt and ηt are correlated (ρ ് 0) and that the variances across regimes are not 
the same. When b୨ ൌ 0, the model reduces to the constant probability model proposed by 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and Hamilton (1989).  
                                                 
13
 We do not discuss here the question as whether the number of states is equal to or different from 2. The interested 
reader may refer to Hamilton (1991), Hansen (1992), and Garcia (1998).  
14
 Any functional form of the transition probabilities that maps the transition variables into the unit interval would be a 
valid choice for a well-defined log-likelihood function: logistic or Probit family of functional forms, Cauchy integral, 
piecewise continuously differentiable variables. We consider here the Normal law because this choice is common 
wisdom in the applied literature (see Kim et al. (2008)).    
15
 See Hamilton (1989). 
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3.3. Estimation and methodological issues 
The above model is estimated via the maximum likelihood (henceforth ML) method with 
relative minor modifications to the nonlinear iterative filter by Hamilton (1989). We define 
the following vectors: Ω୲ ൌ ሺY୲ିଵᇱ , Z୲ᇱሻ’ the vector of observations of y and z up to time t-1 and 
t respectively,  ξ୲ ൌ ሺy୲, y୲ିଵ, … , yଵሻ’ the vector of observations of the endogenous variable, 
and  θ ൌ ൫αଵ, αଶ, βଵ, σଵ, aଵ, bଵ, βଶ, σଶ, aଶ, bଶ,ρ൯’ the vector of parameters.  
The conditional likelihood function of the observed data ξ୲ is defined as 
  Lሺθሻ ൌ ∏ fሺy୲ Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻT୲ୀଵ           (5) 
where 
  
fሺy୲ Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ ൌ ∑ ∑ fሺy୲ s୲⁄ ൌ i, s୲ିଵ ൌ j,Ω୲, ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ୨୧
ൈ Pሺs୲ ൌ i, s୲ିଵ ൌ j Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ.
    (6) 
The weighting probability in (6) is computed recursively by applying Bayes’ rule: 
Pሺs୲ ൌ i, s୲ିଵ ൌ j Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ ൌ P୧୨ሺz୲ሻPሺs୲ିଵ ൌ j Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ
ൌ Pሺs୲ ൌ i s୲ିଵ⁄ ൌ j, z୲ሻPሺs୲ିଵ ൌ j Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ
ൌ P୧୨ሺz୲ሻPሺs୲ିଵ ൌ j Ω୲⁄ , ξ୲ିଵ; θሻ
    (7) 
We also have  
  
ܲሺݏ௧ ൌ ݅ Ω௧ାଵ⁄ , ߦ௧; ߠሻ ൌ ܲሺݏ௧ ൌ ݅ Ω௧⁄ , ߦ௧; ߠሻ
ൌ ଵ
௙ሺ௬೟ Ω೟⁄ ,క೟షభ;ఏሻ
∑ ݂ሺݕ௧ ݏ௧⁄ ൌ ݅, ݏ௧ିଵ ൌ ݆,Ω௧, ߦ௧ିଵ; ߠሻ௝
ൈ ܲሺݏ௧ ൌ ݅, ݏ௧ିଵ ൌ ݆ Ω௧⁄ , ߦ௧ିଵ; ߠሻ
   (8) 
To complete the recursion defined by Equations (6) and (8), we need the regime-dependent 
conditional density functions: 
f൫y୲ s୲⁄ ൌ 1, s୲ିଵ ൌ j,Ω୲, ξ୲ିଵ; θ൯ ൌ
மቀ౯౪షಉభషಊభ೤೟షభ
ಚభ
ቁΦቌ
౗ౠశ౰౪
′ ౘౠషಙቀሺ౯౪షಉభషಊభ೤೟షభሻ/ಚభቁ
ටభషಙమ
ቍ
஢భPభౠሺ୸౪ሻ
  (9a) 
 ݂൫ݕ௧ s୲⁄ ൌ 2, s୲ିଵ ൌ j,Ω୲, ξ୲ିଵ; θ൯ ൌ
థቀ౯౪షಉమషಊమ೤೟షభ
഑మ
ቁΦቌ
షቀೌೕశ೥೟
′ ್ೕቁశഐቀሺ౯౪షಉమషಊమ೤೟షభሻ/഑మቁ
ටభషഐమ
ቍ
ఙమ௉మೕሺ௭೟ሻ
, (9b) 
where φ  is the standard normal probability distribution.  
The parameters of Equations (1) and (4) are thus jointly estimated with ML methods for 
mixtures of Gaussian distributions. As compared with other estimators (for instance, the EM 
algorithm or the Gibbs sampler16), the ML estimator has the advantage of computational ease. 
As shown by Kiefer (1978), if the errors are distributed as a normal law, then the ML yields 
                                                 
16
 See Diebold et al. (1994) and Filardo and Gordon (1998). 
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consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates. Further, the inverse of the matrix of second 
partial derivatives of the likelihood function at the true parameter values is a consistent 
estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the parameter values.  
It should be noticed that two specifications are encompassed with the TVPMS model, 
depending upon the value of ρ. If 0=ρ , there is no correlation between tε  and past values of 
the state variable. In other words, the state variable is exogenous. On the contrary, 0≠ρ  
corresponds to the endogenous switching case. A test of the null hypothesis that the state 
variable is exogenous can thus be derived by testing the null hypothesis  (see Hamilton 
(1994) and Kim et al. (2008)). 
The influence of zt on P1j and P2j gives information about the way the transition variables 
influence the probability of being in either regime or another. For instance, suppose that 
regime 1 is the crisis regime with the highest volatility. A positive (resp. negative value) of b1 
(resp. b2) implies that the transition variable rises the probability of being in the high-
volatility regime at time t and decreases the probability of being in the low-volatility regime, 
regardless of the economy’s state at time t 
4. Main results 
4.1. Marginal contributions 
The marginal advantage of the time-varying specification over the constant transition 
probability model can be assessed by computing the marginal contribution of the transition 
probabilities.17 To measure whether the contribution of time-varying is important, we compute 
the following weighted transition probability series for both states 1 and 2: 
 MCሺp୲ሻ ൌ ሼሾPሺs୲ ൌ i s୲ିଵ ൌ i⁄ ሻሿ െ pതሽ ൈ P൫s୲ିଵ ൌ i y୲⁄ , y୲ିଵ, ڮ , y୲ି୮൯,   i ൌ 1,2      (10) 
where ݌ҧ is the mean of the transition probabilities. One advantage of   MCሺp୲ሻ is that it helps 
detecting when the time variation is important, or the years when the transition variables give 
most information on the different regimes. Figures 7a to 7c reproduce the marginal 
contributions for Brazil, in the case where the transition variables have a significant influence 
on the probabilities, namely bank funding illiquidity, the S&P 500 volatility and the volatility 
of the other LAC emerging markets. The marginal contribution is evidenced by the deviations 
from zero. For the first two transition functions, we observe that the spikes correspond 
generally to the years 2008 and 2009, thereby supporting the assumption that these variables 
are providing important information about changes in volatility occurring during the subprime 
crisis and less information for the years before (Figures 7a and 7b). The case of the third 
variable (changes in the volatility in other LAC equity markets) is even more interesting 
(Figure 7c). It acts as a “fine” detector of turning points in the variations of volatility by 
revealing more spikes in the whole sample (not only during the years 2008 and 2009). The 
domestic market seems to be much more sensitive to contagion effects stemming from the 
regional equity markets than from other US indicators of financial stress. As a consequence, 
this variable helps better to track the changes occurring in the volatility.     
                                                 
17
 The graphs of this contribution are easier to interpret than those of the probabilities of the different regimes. 
0=ρ
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INSERT FIGURES 7a THROUGH 7c ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURES 8a THROUGH 8c ABOUT HERE 
In the case of Mexico, an examination of the figures showing the marginal contribution series 
(Figures 8a through 8c) reveals that the volatility of the other LAC markets convey less 
information on the occurrence of the high volatility change regime (state 2) than the liquidity 
of the US market. The cases of Peru and Chile are very similar to Brazil (Figures 9a to 10b), 
while Colombia resembles Mexico (Figures 11a and 11b).      
INSERT FIGURES 9a, 9b, 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b ABOUT HERE 
4.2. Detailed results for countries 
The results of the estimation of our TVPMS models are contained in Tables 1a through 5.18 As 
previously mentioned, the endogenous variable is the changes in volatility for each Latin 
American market. Various transition variables are considered that aim at representing 
financial characteristics such as market liquidity, funding liquidity, default risk and attitudes 
towards risk.19 To proxy these concepts, the following six transition variables are used:20 (i) 
ABCP spreads, which is an indicator of funding liquidity conditions in the ABCP market 
segment, (ii) an indicator of bank funding liquidity, (iii) the volatility of the S&P 500 stock 
index, which acts as a proxy for market volatility, (iv) the CDS spreads acting as a measure of 
bank’s default risk, (v) a proxy for overall US market liquidity conditions, and (vi) a measure 
of the volatility of the LAC stock returns, defined, for each country i, by the mean of the 
volatility of the other j LAC ( ji ≠ ).  
The significance of time variation is captured by the coefficients ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܾଵ and ܾଶ.
21 The 
regime-switching parameters are ߙଵ, ߙଶ, ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߪଵ and ߪଶ. For all the regressions, the model 
with endogeneity is retained, since the null hypothesis of no correlation between ߝ௧ and ߟ௧ is 
always rejected (ߩ ് 0). 
Brazil 
Because the endogenous variable is the first-difference of the squared returns (changes in 
volatility), the model dichotomizes into regimes that exhibit peaks (the volatility decreases 
hugely after achieving very high levels) and no peaks (changes in volatility are not very 
                                                 
18
 The models are estimated using the first-difference of all the variables. Indeed, we applied unit root tests and found 
that all the variables were I(1). We do not report the results here to save place, but they are available upon request to 
the authors.  
19
 Note that market liquidity is an asset-specific concept referring to the ease with which a position in an asset may be 
liquidated without significantly altering its price, whereas funding liquidity is an institution-specific characteristic 
related to the ability of a financial intermediary to service its liabilities (for a detailed presentation of these concepts, 
see Frank et al. (2008)). 
20
 See Appendix 1. 
21
 Recall that if bj=0, the TVPMS reduces to the constant transition probability model. The significance levels 
associated with these coefficients are reported in Tables 1a through 5 and allow us to test if the hypothesis of constant 
probabilities is rejected in favor of the alternative of time-varying probabilities. In the majority of the cases (see 
detailed results in the tables), the time-varying transition probability model is preferred to the constant probability 
specification, confirming the findings obtained in Section 4.1.  
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important). Consider first the case of the Brazilian S&P/IFCI series. In Table 1a, we see that 
the estimate of the mean volatility change in regime 1 (αଵ) is statistically not significant, 
while it is significantly negative in regime 2 (αଶ). This suggests that there are phases in the 
dynamics of volatility characterized by high peaks, notably in the second regime. The 
interesting point is that, in the latter, changes in volatility are of much higher magnitude than 
in the first regime, as illustrated by the high values of σଶ in comparison with σଵ. We propose 
to label regime 1 as a low-change volatility regime and regime 2 as a high-change volatility 
regime.  
Regarding the transition variables, three of them influence the switches of the volatility 
changes between the two regimes: bank funding illiquidity, the changes in volatility of the 
S&P 500 and the volatility changes of the other LAC’s equity markets. Indeed, the 
significance of the parameters bଵ and bଶ indicates whether the transition variables contain 
information about the probability of being in either regime or the other. Our results show that 
bଵ and/or ܾଶ are statistically significant in respectively the third, fourth and seventh columns. 
An increase in the volatility changes in either the US S&P 500 market or the regional equity 
markets (other LAC’s) decreases the probability of small changes in the Brazilian equity 
market volatility (bଵ is significantly negative). This result is in line with the intuition of a 
contagion effect between the volatility changes of the different markets. For bank funding 
illiquidity, at first glance we obtain somewhat counter-intuitive, respectively positive and 
negative signs for bଵ and bଶ. Indeed, when banks in the US interbank markets are facing 
liquidity problems we would expect them to repatriate capitals from their affiliates in Brazil, 
thereby causing higher changes in volatility (thus, we would expect ܾଵ ൏ 0 and  bଶ ൐ 0). 
However, one explanation to the reversed signs could be that the signs are not showing a 
causality phenomenon, but a correlation. Indeed, the share of foreign banks in the banking 
sector total assets is low in Brazil (less than 30%, as compared, for instance, with Mexico 
where this proportion is nearly 80%). In the aftermath of the subprime crisis, the enterprises 
in the equity markets had to find alternative sources of financing and thereby increased the 
proportion of corporate bonds. Corporate spreads, although they increased, have been less 
volatile than other spreads at short maturities, because the Brazilian firms showed more 
resilience to the crisis than firms in the industrialized countries. As a consequence, the 
positive sign of  bଵ reflects a situation in which, as the US markets were showing a higher 
volatility, the Brazilian companies made a substitution in their sources of financing.  
The other financial stress indicators in the US markets reveal little information about the 
future state of the volatility changes (the coefficients bଵ and bଶ are not statistically significant 
for the CDS spreads or the US market liquidity). 
The next step is to investigate whether the time-varying inferred probabilities are correlated 
with the chronology of the volatility changes observed in reality. In this view, Table 1a also 
contains the percentage of probabilities above 0.5 for each regime and each year. The results 
are as expected. Indeed, in state 1 (low changes in the volatility), the probabilities are very 
high in 2004, 2005, 2006, and then, they decrease from 2007 onwards. Conversely, we 
observe low probabilities in state 2 during the years 2004 to 2006, and they increase 
substantially in 2008 and 2009. All these findings also apply for the BOVESPA stock returns. 
The difference is that the volatility variables (S&P 500 and other LAC) are the only ones 
playing a significant role in influencing the probability of being in either regime or the other 
(see Table 1b). 
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INSERT TABLES 1a and 1b ABOUT HERE 
Mexico 
The case of Mexico’s equity markets shows a contrasted view, as compared with the Brazilian 
situation (Table 2a). Indeed, given the high degree of integration between the US and 
Mexican financial markets, we find a significant influence of all the transition variables, with 
significant coefficients for bଵ and/or bଶ. Except the inversed signs of the variable “banking 
funding illiquidity” that we already noticed for Brazil, for the other variables,  bଵ is negative 
while bଶ is either positive or statistically non-significant. Therefore, more financial stress in 
the US market reduces the probability of not observing important peaks (and huge downturns) 
in the volatility changes. Interestingly, the probabilities reported in Table 2a reveal that, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, the deterioration of the financial conditions in the US markets 
increased importantly the probability of a high volatility change regime (for instance, the 
percentage of probabilities above 0.5 is higher than 70% in general, in comparison with 50% 
in the case of Brazil). Comparing the findings obtained for the Mexican S&P/IFCI series with 
those using the BOLSA stock returns, we obtain very similar results (Table 2b). 
INSERT TABLES 2a and 2b ABOUT HERE 
Chile, Colombia and Peru 
The situation of the other countries in our sample resembles that of either Mexico or Brazil, 
despite some differences. In Chile, with the exception of market liquidity, the domestic 
markets are in general influenced by the US financial stress indicators (see Tables 3a-3b). 
However, the latter do not perform quite well as “leading indicators” of times of crisis (when 
changes in volatility are characterized by high peaks with troughs of high magnitude), since 
they do not have a stronger explanatory power on the probability of being in regime 2. Indeed, 
if we compare the case of Mexico with that of Chile, the percentages of probabilities above 
0.5 in the second regime are quite low, even during the years 2008 and 2009.  
The situation of Peru is very close to that of Brazil, with only an influence of the US and 
LAC’s volatility changes driving the domestic volatility switches (Tables 4a-4b). Turning to 
Colombia, it is in an intermediate situation between Brazil and Mexico with the CDS being 
the only statistically significant transition variable in addition to the market volatility series 
(but with smaller probabilities above 0.5 in regime 2); see Table 5 and Figures 11a and 11b.   
INSERT TABLES 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b and 5 ABOUT HERE 
4.3. What explains the observed differences between the LAC and what are the 
implications in terms of financial regulation? 
Our findings globally put forward the importance of US financial stress indicators on the 
volatility of the LAC stock markets. They are in line with those obtained by Dooley and 
Hutchinson (2009) showing that the emerging markets (among which Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico) indeed reacted to a host of bad news on the US economy, such as the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, the write-downs of equities in US financial institutions, or housing 
market developments. These factors had the effect of raising the CDS spread basis in the LAC 
financial markets, because they were providing bad news about the liquidity problems facing 
the US banks and credit markets. The changes in the CDS spreads were then transmitted to 
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the volatility of the equity markets with more or less magnitude depending upon the strength 
of the LAC market interdependence with the US markets. During episodes of heightened 
volatility and intensive financial stress in the US markets, “irrational” moods (caused by 
liquidity needs) were the predominant factor of contagion. In this context, changes in the 
equity prices’ volatility took the form of clearly identifiable, discrete events happening only 
occasionally. Markov-switching models appear adequate to model such contagion shifts.  
Though for all the countries the model dichotomizes into two regimes of respectively low and 
high changes in volatility, the above results point to two main differences between the Latin 
American countries. A first difference is that in Chile and Mexico, the interest rate spreads in 
the US markets (CDS, ABCP, bank funding liquidity) were at play to account for high 
changes in the volatility during the crisis in addition to market volatility variables, while 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru seem to be more sensitive to the volatility of the regional financial 
markets. Secondly, the relevance of the different financial variables in accounting for the 
evolution into the second regime (characterized by high volatility changes) is important for 
Mexico (to a less extent for Brazil) and of somewhat less importance for Chile, Colombia and 
Peru (for which we find quite small percentages of probabilities above 0.5 in regime 2 during 
the years 2008 and 2009).  
These differences are in line with the observed stylized facts. Firstly, some countries have 
increased domestic securization and implemented regulatory framework that have made it 
difficult to domestic bank to buy asset-backed securities in the US markets. This concerns 
mainly the four countries other than Mexico. Because their banks’ balance sheets were not as 
exposed to the toxic assets as in the industrialized countries, the stock market volatilities 
showed more resilience to the increased financial stress in the US. Another point needs to be 
mentioned. In Peru, Colombia, Chile and Brazil, a substantial share of capitalization in the 
equity markets is linked to commodity and energy activities. This means that the peaks 
observed in the changes of volatility did not only stem from the financial stress in the US 
markets, but also from the huge drop in the prices of raw materials, commodities, oil that was 
observed at the beginning of the crisis.22 Therefore, the stock valuations appeared to decline in 
line with the low performance of the world commodity markets. Conversely, in Mexico, the 
channel of contagion from the US financial stress is predominant because of the importance 
of cross-border funding flows for the Mexican companies.  
Several comments are worth making regarding the implications of the above results in terms 
of financial regulation. According to us, the dependence to the US capital markets does not 
necessarily imply a return to past capital controls. Though some countries may be tempted to 
adopt such policies (for instance, Brazil has a low degree of financial openness as compared 
to many LAC), one way to counter the contagion effects from the US market would be to 
revive the intra-regional integration of capital markets and to adopt risk-sharing schemes 
between countries. Those experiencing moderate losses from the financial shocks could 
provide capital transfers to others more severely hit. This is possible in a context of huge 
accumulation of reserves by countries like Peru or Brazil which are exporters of raw 
materials. Another adequate policy to smooth the contagion effects in the dependent countries 
(Mexico and Colombia) could be to adopt an “insurance” mechanism by improving the 
external accounts during calm or financial boom periods and use the proceeds as protection 
                                                 
22
 An extension of the present study would be to investigate the role of commodity price volatility, but this is beyond 
the scope of the paper and left for future research.  
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during the downswings of markets. This strategy has been useful in Brazil, and helped the 
authorities to dampen the volatility of capital outflows and thereby of stock prices. A third 
solution to make the LAC become more immune to the turmoil in the US financial markets 
may be to increase financing through multilateral institutions’ facilities (IMF or regional 
banks such as the inter-American development bank). Colombia and Mexico benefited from 
such credit lines in 2009.  
5. Conclusion 
How extensive were the financial linkages between the Latin American countries and the 
United States during the subprime crisis? This paper attempts to answer this question by using 
a new empirical approach based on time-varying probability Markov-switching models. Our 
estimations show that a broad range of stress indicators in the US financial market can cause 
abrupt changes in the volatility of the LAC stock markets. These US factors had the effect of 
raising the CDS spread basis in the LAC financial markets, because they were notably 
providing bad news about the liquidity problems facing the US banks and credit markets. The 
changes in the CDS spreads were then transmitted to the volatility of the equity markets with 
more or less magnitude depending upon the strength of the LAC market interdependence with 
the US markets. We find that Mexico is the most vulnerable to the US financial stress, since 
this country has the closer links with the US financial markets; all the US transition variables 
being informative about the dynamics of the Mexican stock market volatility. A similar 
conclusion holds for Chile, although not all the transition variables were statistically 
significant. The other countries seem to be much more sensible to the activity in the regional 
financial markets (Colombia, Peru and Brazil).  
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 Appendix 
Appendix 1. Data description  
 
Source: Datastream for all series. 
Frequency: Daily. Period: January 1, 2004 to April 7, 2009. Number of observations: 1374. 
 
Financial stress indicators 
• ABCP spreads: Spread between the yield of 3-month ABCP and that of 3-month US 
Treasury bill. This is an indicator of funding liquidity conditions in the ABCP market 
segment. 
• Bank funding liquidity: Spread between the 3-month US interbank rate and the US federal 
funds rate. This is an indicator of bank funding liquidity. 
• Market volatility: Volatility of the S&P 500 index, which is a proxy of market volatility, 
measured by the square of S&P 500 stock returns. 
• Market liquidity: two proxies of overall market liquidity conditions are used: (i) Spread 
between the US 30-year Treasury bonds and the US 10-year Treasury bonds, and (ii) 
Spread between the US 5-year Treasury bonds and the US 2-year Treasury bonds. 
• CDS spreads: 5-year US bank sector CDS. This is a measure of banks' default risk. 
 
Equity indexes  
Two series of equity indices are considered for each country (except for Colombia): 
• S&P IFCI price indices. S&P/IFCI (Investable) indices are subsets of S&P/IFCG indices 
and measure the returns of stocks that are legally and practically available to foreign 
investors. Note that S&P/IFCI indices typically cover a high percentage of the stocks in 
the S&P/IFCG indices. 
• The following stock indices: (i) BOVESPA price index for Brazil, (ii) Chile INTER10 
price index for Chile, (iii) IGBC price index for Colombia, (iv) BOLSA price index for 
Mexico, and (v) LIMA SE price index for Peru. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A1. Information criteria on nonlinear GARCH models: S&P/IFCI indices 
 
    Brazil Chile Mexico Peru 
GARCH 
LM -2617.06 -1708.23 -2310.17 -2603.35 
AIC 3.8685 2.5251 3.4149 3.8482 
BIC 3.9058 2.5677 3.4575 3.8855 
EGARCH 
LM -2626.29 -1712.17 NC -2605.62 
AIC 3.8821 2.5309 NA 3.8516 
BIC 3.9248 2.5788 NA 3.8942 
PGARCH 
LM NC -1715.50 -2538.56 -2604.21 
AIC NA 2.5358 3.7525 3.8495 
BIC NA 2.5891 3.8057 3.8975 
LSTGARCH 
LM -2611.96 NC -2308.63 -2603.07 
AIC 3.8609 NA 3.4126 3.8478 
BIC 3.9089 NA 3.4659 3.8958 
ESTGARCH 
LM -2621.56 -1707.23 -2310.11 -2603.26 
AIC 3.9178 2.5236 3.4148 3.8481 
BIC 3.8752 2.5769 3.4680 3.8961 
ANST-
GARH 
LM -2621.49 -1707.37 -2309.83 NC 
AIC 3.9284 2.5238 3.4143 NA 
BIC 3.8751 2.5877 3.4783 NA 
QGARCH 
LM -2617.48 -1708.20 -2308.97 -2603.26 
AIC 3.8692 2.5250 3.4130 3.8480 
BIC 3.9065 2.5730 3.4610 3.8900 
       Note: LM: maximum likelihood, AIC: Akaike, BIC: Schwarz. 
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Table A2. Information criteria on nonlinear GARCH models: other stock indices   
 
  Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru 
GARCH 
LM -2701.71 -2001,09 -2271.43 -2263.42 -2432.34 
AIC 3.9936 2.9422 3.3576 3.3457 3.5954 
BIC 4.0309 2.9795 3.4162 3.3884 3.6434 
EGARCH 
LM -2711.11 -1987.68 -2279.28 -2273.53 -2441.37 
AIC 4.0075 2.9381 3.3692 3.3607 3.6088 
BIC 4.0501 2.9808 3.4331 3.4086 3.6621 
PGARCH 
LM NC -1987.86 -2275.59 -2272.33 -2444.98 
AIC NA 2.9384 3.3637 3.3589 3.6141 
BIC NA 2.9864 3.4330 3.4122 3.6727 
LSTGARCH 
LM NC -1988.40 -2270.30 -2259.20 -2429.50 
AIC NA 2.9392 3.3559 3.3395 3.5912 
BIC NA 2.9872 3.4252 3.3928 3.6499 
ESTGARCH 
LM -2700.26 -1988.31 -2271.43 -2263.19 NC 
AIC 3.9915 2.9391 3.3576 3.3454 NA 
BIC 4.0394 2.9870 3.4269 3.3987 NA 
ANST-
GARH 
LM -2701.36 -1989.55 -2272.96 -2263.07 -2431.77 
AIC 3.9931 2.9409 3.3598 3.3452 3.5946 
BIC 4.0517 2.9995 3.4398 3.4092 3.6639 
QGARCH 
LM -2696.45 -1988.93 -2270.42 -2260.68 -2431.18 
AIC 3.9850 2.9400 3.3560 3.3410 3.5930 
BIC 4.0280 2.9820 3.4200 3.3890 3.6470 
 Note: LM: maximum likelihood, AIC: Akaike, BIC: Schwarz. 
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Table A3. Testing linearity against the alternative of Markov-switching models   
 
 
  SupTS 1% cv 5% cv 10% cv 
Brazil      
 S&P/IFCI returns 8.9336 5.3050  4.2377  3.7161
 BOVESPA returns 9.1763 5.3077  4.2251  3.7173
Chile   
 S&P/IFCI returns 116.6136 5.8430  4.5243  3.8978
 INTER 10 returns 127.9986 5.7403 4.5380  3.8196
Colombia   
 IGBC returns 23.1380 5.3762  4.4219  3.7544
Mexico   
 S&P/IFCI returns 10.1714 5.3646 4.4201  3.7563
 BOLSA returns 8.9262 5.4008 4.4334 3.7716
Peru   
 S&P/IFCI returns 13.6802 5.4050  4.4473  3.8101
 LIMA SE returns 11.2773 5.8345  4.5198  3.8474
Note: Empirical critical values (cv) are computed from 500 iterations for a sample size equal to the size of the 
original data set. The statistic, SupTS, is obtained by searching the maximum over two nuisance parameters, h (h is 
a vector specifying the direction of the alternative) and ρ=p+q-1 (p and q are transition probabilities under the 
alternative); it is computed by drawing h uniformly over the unit sphere (20 values used) and by taking the values of 
ρ in an equally spaced grid (30 values used).  
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Table 1a. Estimation of TVPMS model – Brazil – S&P/IFCI returns 
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.0059 0.01 -1.18* 
ߙଶ -9.46* -9.12* -6.03* -8.79* -9.21* 22.89* 
ߚଵ -0.40* -0.39* -0.43* -0.39* -0.40* -0.86* 
ߚଶ -0.64* -0.65* -0.61* -0.64* -0.64* -0.22* 
ߪଵ 2.54* 2.52* 2.49* 2.50* 2.50* 5.30* 
ߪଶ 21.85* 21.67* 21.73* 21.64* 21.75* 21.01* 
ܽଵ 1.41* 1.43* 1.96* 1.43* 1.41* 0.68* 
ܽଶ -0.76* -0.79* -0.72* -0.78* -0.76* 41.84 
ܾଵ 0.11 1.64* -0.45* -0.02 -5.65 -0.08* 
ܾଶ 0.20 -0.98** 0.02* -0.001 -1.26 -6.50 
ߩ 0.64* 0.65* 0.58* 0.62* 0.63* -0.94* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 93.46 
(6.54) 
92.31 
(7.69) 
93.65 
(6.15) 
93.46 
(6.54) 
93.46 
(6.54) 
95.77 
(4.23) 
2006 86.54 
(13.46) 
86.54 
(13.46) 
89.23 
(10.77) 
86.54 
(13.46) 
86.54 
(13.46) 
93.08 
(6.92) 
2007 81.23 
(18.77) 
81.23 
(18.77) 
78.93 
(21.07) 
80.84 
(19.16) 
80.84 
(19.16) 
87.74 
(12.26) 
2008 57.63 
(42.37) 
57.25 
(42.75) 
53.82 
(46.18) 
57.25 
(42.75) 
56.87 
(43.13) 
72.14 
(27.86) 
2009 43.48 
(56.52) 
44.93 
(55.07) 
40.58 
(59.42) 
43.48 
(56.52) 
43.48 
(56.52) 
68.12 
(31.88) 
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Table 1b. Estimation of TVPMS model – Brazil – BOVESPA returns 
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US Market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.19** 
ߙଶ -12.51* -12.25* -7.01* -12.29* -12.34* -4.79** 
ߚଵ -0.45* -0.44* -0.46* -0.45* -0.45* -0.47* 
ߚଶ -0.64* -0.35* -0.61* -0.64* -0.64* -0.63* 
ߪଵ 3.10* 3.12* 3.02* 3.12* 3.03* 3.39* 
ߪଶ 25.18* 25.12* 24.67* 25.31* 24.92* 27.49* 
ܽଵ 1.40* 1.42* 1.96* 1.42* 1.38* 2.34* 
ܽଶ -0.63* -0.64* -0.63* -0.64* -0.62* -0.60* 
ܾଵ 0.14 0.66 -0.46* 0.0053 -4.90 -0.30* 
ܾଶ 0.05 -0.78 0.02* 0.0019 -1.05 0.02* 
ߩ 0.64* 0.64* 0.55* 0.63* 0.64* 0.39* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 91.54 
(8.46) 
91.54 
(8.46) 
93.46 
(6.54) 
91.92 
(8.08) 
91.54 
(8.46) 
96.15 
(3.85) 
2006 90.77 
(9.23) 
90.38 
(9.62) 
91.15 
(8.85) 
90.77 
(9.23) 
90.38 
(9.62) 
92.69 
(7.31) 
2007 85.44 
(14.56) 
85.82 
(14.18) 
83.14 
(16.86) 
85.82 
(14.18) 
85.06 
(14.94) 
87.74 
(12.26) 
2008 63.74 
(36.26) 
63.36 
(36.64) 
60.69 
(39.31) 
63.74 
(36.26) 
62.21 
(37.79) 
65.65 
(34.35) 
2009 55.07 
(44.93) 
55.07 
(44.93) 
50.72 
(49.28) 
55.07 
(44.93) 
52.17 
(47.83) 
55.07 
(44.93) 
Note: * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
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Table 2a. Estimation of TVPMS model – Mexico – S&P/IFCI returns 
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.0114 0.0086 -0.037 0.009 0.0083 -0.02 
ߙଶ -3.50* -3.91* -2.66* -3.75* -3.73* -3.06* 
ߚଵ -0.49* -0.48* -0.47* -0.49* -0.48* -0.48* 
ߚଶ -0.55* -0.55* -0.53* -0.55* -0.55* -0.54* 
ߪଵ 1.40* 1.41* 1.44* 1.41* 1.40* 1.46* 
ߪଶ 14.52* 14.59* 15.12* 14.60* 14.53* 15.14* 
ܽଵ 1.69* 1.63* 2.27* 1.69* 1.69* 2.06* 
ܽଶ -1.06* -1.04* -0.91* -1.04* -1.05* -1.01* 
ܾଵ -3.58* 1.96* -0.51* -0.05* -13.93* -0.19* 
ܾଶ 0.04 -0.59 0.01* -0.0009 -2.19 0.0061 
ߩ 0.50* 0.53* 0.45* 0.52* 0.53* 0.48* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 93.08 
(6.92) 
93.08 
(6.92) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
93.08 
(6.92) 
93.08 
(6.92) 
93.08 
(6.92) 
2006 80.38 
(19.62) 
80.77 
(19.23) 
81.54 
(18.46) 
80.77 
(19.23) 
80.38 
(19.62) 
82.31 
(17.69) 
2007 73.95 
(26.05) 
74.33 
(25.67) 
76.25 
(23.75) 
74.71 
(25.29) 
74.71 
(25.29) 
76.63 
(23.37) 
2008 59.94 
(40.46) 
59.92 
(40.08) 
57.25 
(42.75) 
59.16 
(40.84) 
58.78 
(41.22) 
60.69 
(39.31) 
2009 26.09 
(73.91) 
27.54 
(72.46) 
27.54 
(72.46) 
27.54 
(72.46) 
26.09 
(73.91) 
27.54 
(72.46) 
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Table 2b. Estimation of TVPMS model – Mexico – BOLSA returns  
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US Market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.04 -0.0051 0.0014 -0.029 
ߙଶ -3.89* -3.81* -2.27** -3.58* -3.71* -2.62* 
ߚଵ -0.52* -0.52* -0.51* -0.52* -0.52* -0.52* 
ߚଶ -0.54* -0.55* -0.53* -0.54* -0.54* -0.54* 
ߪଵ 1.32* 1.33 1.39* 1.32* 1.33* 1.42* 
ߪଶ 13.86* 13.91* 14.62* 13.81* 13.84* 14.72* 
ܽଵ 1.60* 1.64* 2.13* 1.66* 1.68* 2.11* 
ܽଶ -1.00* -1.02 -0.91* -1.02* -1.03* -0.95* 
ܾଵ -0.77 2.29* -0.38* -0.04* -13.13 -0.19* 
ܾଶ -0.08 -0.56 0.0094 0.0004 -4.38 0.0046 
ߩ 0.52* 0.53* 0.37* 0.51* 0.53* 0.41* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 93.46 
(6.54) 
93.85 
(6.15) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
93.46 
(6.54) 
93.85* 
(6.15) 
94.62 
(5.38) 
2006 81.15 
(18.85) 
81.54 
(18.46) 
83.08 
(16.92) 
81.15 
(18.85) 
80.77 
(19.23) 
83.08 
(16.92) 
2007 75.48 
(24.52) 
75.48 
(24.52) 
77.39 
(22.61) 
74.71 
(25.29) 
75.48 
(24.52) 
79.31 
(20.69) 
2008 62.98 
(37.02) 
63.74 
(36.26) 
62.60 
(37.40) 
62.21 
(37.79) 
62.60 
(37.40) 
63.36 
(36.64) 
2009 28.99 
(71.01) 
28.99 
(71.01) 
28.99 
(71.01) 
28.99 
(71.01) 
27.54 
(72.46) 
30.43 
(69.57) 
Note: * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
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Table 3a. Estimation of TVPMS model – Chile – S&P/IFCI returns 
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.01 -0.008 -0.0005 -0.01 
ߙଶ -3.57* -3.31* -2.97* -3.41* -3.76* -2.77* 
ߚଵ -0.45* -0.46* -0.43* -0.45* -0.543* -0.43* 
ߚଶ -0.41* -0.41* -0.40* -0.41* -0.41* -0.40* 
ߪଵ 0.70* 0.71* 0.75* 0.637* 0.70* 0.73* 
ߪଶ 13.69* 13.79* 14.62* 13.30* 13.77* 14.19* 
ܽଵ 1.80* 1.87* 2.28* 1.92* 1.78* 2.11* 
ܽଶ -0.93* -0.97* -0.80* -0.88* -0.91* -0.92* 
ܾଵ -1.32* -3.07 -0.28* -0.09* 2.57 -0.1* 
ܾଶ -0.19 0.16 0.003 0.003 -3.72 0.0015 
ߩ 0.41* 0.40* 0.38* 0.44* 0.41* 0.35* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 98.08 
(1.92) 
98.08 
(1.92) 
98.85 
(1.15) 
97.69 
(2.31) 
98.08 
(1.92) 
98.46 
(1.54) 
2006 96.92 
(3.08) 
96.92 
(3.08) 
97.69 
(2.31) 
96.54 
(3.46) 
96.92 
(3.08) 
96.92 
(3.08) 
2007 79.31 
(20.69) 
80.08 
(19.92) 
82.38 
(17.62) 
78.54 
(21.46) 
79.69 
(20.31) 
82.38 
(17.62) 
2008 62.60 
(37.40) 
65.27 
(34.73) 
66.03 
(33.97) 
61.45 
(38.55) 
63.36 
(36.64) 
65.65 
(34.35) 
2009 62.32 
(37.68) 
62.32 
(37.68) 
60.87 
(39.13) 
56.52 
(43.48) 
62.32 
(37.68) 
60.87 
(39.13) 
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Table 3b. Estimation of TVPMS model – Chile – Chile INTER 10 returns  
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US Market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
ߙଶ -6.00* -5.66* -5.39* -5.79* -6.08* -5.10* 
ߚଵ -0.44* -0.43* -0.45* -0.45* -0.44* -0.45* 
ߚଶ -0.43* -0.43* -0.41* -0.42* -0.43* -0.43* 
ߪଵ 1.07* 1.08* 1.03* 1.06* 1.06* 1.03* 
ߪଶ 17.34* 17.41* 17.11* 17.21* 17.25* 17.00* 
ܽଵ 1.66* 1.71* 1.78* 1.68* 1.65* 1.75* 
ܽଶ -0.82* -0.85* -0.66* -0.80* -0.81* -0.74* 
ܾଵ 0.24 1.94** -0.17* -0.01* -3.37 -0.06* 
ܾଶ 0.22 -0.17 0.0051 0.005 -2.98 0.0001 
ߩ 0.47* 0.47* 0.46* 0.47* 0.49* 0.43* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 94.23 
(5.77) 
94.62 
(5.38) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
93.85 
(6.15) 
2006 96.15 
(3.85) 
96.15 
(3.85) 
95.77 
(4.23) 
95.77 
(4.23) 
96.15 
(3.85) 
95.38 
(4.62) 
2007 81.61 
(18.39) 
81.61 
(18.39) 
80.84 
(19.16) 
81.61 
(18.39) 
81.61 
(18.39) 
80.84 
(19.16) 
2008 58.78 
(41.22) 
58.78 
(41.22) 
57.25 
(42.75) 
58.78 
(41.22) 
58.40 
(41.60) 
57.63 
(42.37) 
2009 84.06 
(15.94) 
84.06 
(15.94) 
73.91 
(26.09) 
84.06 
(15.94) 
82.61 
(17.39) 
75.36 
(24.64) 
Note: * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4a. Estimation of TVPMS model – Peru – S&P/IFCI returns 
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.01 
ߙଶ -10.01* -10.13* -10.28* -10.45* -10.12* -8.12* 
ߚଵ -0.31* -0.31* -0.32* -0.31* -0.31* -0.34* 
ߚଶ -0.52* -0.51* -0.50* -0.51* -0.52* -0.49* 
ߪଵ 2.22* 2.22* 2.22* 2.23* 2.22* 2.20* 
ߪଶ 22.45* 22.39* 22.15* 22.40* 22.41* 22.09* 
ܽଵ 1.37* 1.36* 1.38* 1.35* 1.35* 1.57* 
ܽଶ -0.75* -0.75* -0.70* -0.75* -0.74* -0.75* 
ܾଵ 0.7** -0.78 -0.07* -0.008 0.28 -0.13* 
ܾଶ 0.15 0.39 0.01* 0.009 1.23 0.02* 
ߩ 0.64* 0.65* 0.68* 0.66* 0.65* 0.63* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 88.85 
(11.15) 
88.46 
(11.54) 
88.46 
(11.54) 
88.85 
(11.15) 
88.85 
(11.15) 
88.85 
(11.15) 
2006 79.23 
(20.77) 
79.23 
(20.77) 
79.23 
(20.77) 
79.23 
(20.77) 
79.23 
(20.77) 
80.00 
(20.00) 
2007 83.52 
(16.48) 
83.52 
(16.48) 
83.14 
(16.86) 
83.52 
(16.48) 
83.14 
(16.86) 
83.91 
(16.09) 
2008 65.27 
(34.73) 
65.27 
(34.73) 
64.12 
(35.88) 
65.27 
(34.73) 
65.27 
(34.73) 
62.60 
(37.40) 
2009 47.83 
(52.17) 
47.83 
(52.17) 
44.93 
(55.07) 
47.83 
(52.17) 
47.83 
(52.17) 
43.48 
(56.52) 
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Table 4b. Estimation of TVPMS model – Peru – LIMA SE returns  
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US Market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
ߙଶ -5.13* -4.92* -6.76* -5.07* -5.00* -5.26* 
ߚଵ -0.41* -0.42* -0.31* -0.41* -0.42* -0.38* 
ߚଶ -0.41* -0.41* -0.41* -0.41* -0.42* -0.40* 
ߪଵ 1.62* 1.59* 1.65* 1.60* 1.62* 1.60* 
ߪଶ 23.84* 23.57* 24.10* 23.72* 23.78* 23.67* 
ܽଵ 1.57* 1.56* 1.52* 1.58* 1.56* 1.65* 
ܽଶ -1.07* -1.10* -0.98* -1.07* -1.09* -1.03* 
ܾଵ -1.57* -0.98 -0.04* -0.03* -3.63 -0.10* 
ܾଶ -0.11 0.48 0.01* 0.0028 -3.20 0.01** 
ߩ 0.44* 0.43* 0.52* 0.44* 0.43* 0.47* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 94.23 
(5.77) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
93.85 
(6.15) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
94.23 
(5.77) 
93.85 
(6.15) 
2006 73.46 
(26.54) 
72.69 
(27.31) 
74.23 
(25.77) 
73.08 
(26.92) 
73.08 
(26.92) 
72.69 
(27.31) 
2007 75.10 
(24.90) 
75.10 
(24.90) 
77.39 
(22.61) 
75.48 
(24.52) 
75.10 
(24.90) 
75.10 
(24.90) 
2008 50.76 
(49.24) 
51.15 
(48.85) 
51.15 
(48.85) 
48.85 
(51.15) 
51.91 
(48.09) 
50.00 
(50.00) 
2009 50.72 
(49.28) 
53.62 
(46.38) 
53.62 
(46.38) 
52.17 
(47.83) 
56.52 
(43.48) 
50.72 
(49.28 
Note: * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Estimation of TVPMS model – Colombia – IGBC returns  
 
 ABCP 
spreads 
Bank 
funding 
S&P 500 
volatility 
CDS spreads US Market 
liquidity 
Other LAC 
volatility 
ߙଵ 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0034 -0.0052 -0.0005 -0.01 
ߙଶ -7.77* -7.70* -8.08* -7.65* -7.72* -6.91* 
ߚଵ -0.41* -0.40* -0.41* -0.40* -0.41* -0.39* 
ߚଶ -0.55* -0.55* -0.55* -0.55* -0.55* -0.55* 
ߪଵ 1.59* 1.58* 1.58* 1.56* 1.58* 1.59* 
ߪଶ 23.37* 23.29* 23.46* 23.09* 23.28* 23.40* 
ܽଵ 1.65* 1.63* 1.63* 1.63* 1.63* 1.72* 
ܽଶ -0.76* -0.75* -0.71* -0.74* -0.74* -0.75* 
ܾଵ -0.44 0.18 0.02* 0.01* 0.43 -0.05* 
ܾଶ 0.52 0.69 0.0 0.01 -1.28 0.0017 
ߩ 0.45* 0.44* 0.45* 0.45* 0.44* 0.42* 
 Percentage of probabilities higher than 0.5 
 Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
Regime 1 
(Regime 2) 
2005 87.31 
(12.69) 
86.15 
(13.85) 
86.92 
(13.08) 
86.15 
(13.85) 
86.15 
(13.85) 
87.31 
(12.639) 
2006 73.85 
(26.15) 
73.46 
(26.54) 
74.23 
(25.77) 
73.08 
(26.92) 
73.85 
(26.15) 
73.46 
(26.54) 
2007 90.42 
(9.58) 
90.42 
(9.58) 
90.42 
(9.58) 
90.42 
(9.58) 
90.42 
(9.58) 
90.04 
(9.96) 
2008 79.77 
(20.23) 
79.39 
(20.61) 
79.39 
(20.61) 
78.24 
(21.76) 
79.39 
(20.61) 
79.01 
(20.99) 
2009 100.0 
(0.0) 
98.55 
(1.45) 
100 
(0.0) 
98.55 
(1.45) 
98.55 
(1.45) 
97.10 
(2.90) 
Note: * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Squared returns (left) and their distribution (right) - stock markets 
 
This figure reports the evolution of the squared returns of the five considered stock indexes, together with their 
distribution. 
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Colombia 
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Figure 2. Stock returns volatility estimated from a GARCH-type model 
 
This figure reports the volatility (VOL) of stock returns estimated from a GARCH model for the five considered 
countries: Brazil (BR), Chile (CH), Colombia (CO), Mexico (ME) and Peru (PE). 
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Figure 3. ABCP spreads 
 
Figure 4. CDS spreads 
Figure 5. US Market liquidity Figure 6. S&P 500 Volatility 
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Figures 7 and 8. Marginal contribution of the transition variables 
 
Figure 7a. Brazil – Bank funding 
 
 
Figure 7b. Brazil – S&P 500 volatility 
 
Figure 7c. Brazil – Other LAC volatility 
 
Figure 8a. Mexico – ABCP spreads 
 
 
Figure 8b. Mexico – US market 
liquidity 
Figure 8c. Mexico – Other LAC volatility 
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Figures 9, 10 and 11. Marginal contribution of the transition variables 
 
Figure 9a. Chile – ABCP spreads Figure 9b. Chile – CDS spreads Figure 10a. Peru – S&P 500 volatility 
 
Figure 10b. Peru – Other LAC volatility 
 
 
Figure 11a. Colombia – CDS spreads 
 
Figure 11b. Colombia – Other LAC 
volatility 
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